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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Algerian rebel official says reply to De Gaulle was in defiance of Nasir.

UAR favors retention of US bases in Morocco and urges American aid to combat Communist-bloc influence in Guinea.

Indonesia establishes committee to coordinate efforts to establish sovereignty over New Guinea.



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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

OK
Algeria: Mohamed Yazid, minister of information for the Algerian rebels, told an officer of the US Embassy in Tunis that the rebel reply to De Gaulle was in defiance of Nasir, whose propaganda has demanded that the rebels reject the French program. Yazid stressed the conciliatory aspects of the rebel reply, stating that the National Liberation Front (FLN) was prepared to negotiate as individuals with the French rather than as a government, and that it had no "firm position" on problems such as the disposition of Saharan oil or the post-independence administration of the Saharan departments. Yazid's remarks appear designed to convince the US of the importance of securing French agreement to talk with the rebels.

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UAR - Morocco-Guinea:

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Early this month the UAR ambassador in Conakry urged the American ambassador to seek "all-out" American aid to combat Communist-bloc influence in Guinea.

Cairo probably considers that at present the influence of the French in North Africa and the effort of the Communist bloc in Guinea represent the most immediate threat to its own ambitions in Africa.

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OK
Indonesia: The cabinet has set up a "West Irian Committee," with Foreign Minister Subandrio as chairman and heavily weighted with nationalists and leftists, to coordinate Indonesian efforts to establish sovereignty over Netherlands New Guinea. For the past year the army has prevented Communist exploitation of the West Irian issue. The appointment of the Communist-inclined air force chief of staff as vice chairman of the new West Irian Committee will probably further strain the already deteriorating relations between the air force and army.

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DAILY BRIEF

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Algerian Rebels Stress Moderation of Their Stand

Mohamed Yazid, minister of information for the Algerian rebels, has emphasized to an American official the conciliatory aspects of the rebel response to De Gaulle's self-determination proposals. He described the rebel reply as being in defiance of UAR President Nasir, whose propaganda has demanded that the rebels reject De Gaulle's program. Yazid's remarks appear designed to convince the United States of the importance of securing French agreement to talk with the rebels.

Yazid stated that the rebel National Liberation Front (FLN) insists on "some kind of talks" with France, but added that they need not be formal negotiations and that rebel leaders are prepared to go to Paris as individuals rather than as representatives of an Algerian provisional government. With respect to problems such as preconditions for independence and the control of Saharan oil, he emphasized that the rebels have no firm position and that these topics are proper subjects for discussion.

While in their desire for negotiations the rebels have assumed a flexible posture, they would probably find it difficult in any talks to yield to the French on matters such as control of the Sahara. Even moderate rebel leaders appear to have misgivings concerning French motives, and the rank-and-file sentiment among the FLN is probably more anti-French than that of the leadership. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] FLN leaders have rejected a suggestion by President Bourguiba that they send representatives to Paris immediately, insisting that they must receive assurances from De Gaulle on such issues as election conditions and Saharan oil before opening discussions. [REDACTED]

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UAR Expresses Approval of US Bases in Morocco

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[The UAR ambassadors in Rabat and Conakry have recently indicated Cairo's approval of American assistance to Morocco and Guinea, in radical contrast to Cairo's past policy opposing American influence in Africa.]

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[Earlier in the month, UAR Ambassador Najib in Conakry, talking with American Ambassador Morrow, urged "all-out" Western aid, particularly American, to assist President Sekou Touré in maintaining an "independent policy" and to combat Communist-bloc influence in Guinea.]

[The two recommendations may in part reflect Nasir's growing confidence in improved UAR-US relations and a desire to effect a balance between Eastern and Western influence in the area. At the same time, Nasir probably considers France and the Communist bloc the more immediate threat to his own ambition to extend his influence in Africa.]

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[Ambassador Najib made much of the Communist threat in Guinea and the alleged attempts by bloc representatives to prejudice the Conakry government against Nasir.]

[In addition, the UAR, which has made excessive promises to furnish economic assistance to various underdeveloped countries, may hope to garner some small credit for "helping along" the flow of American aid.]

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New Indonesian Committee May Obstruct Army's
Anti-Communist Efforts

The Indonesian cabinet on 28 September established a West Irian Committee to coordinate efforts to achieve control of Netherlands New Guinea. Although the committee is headed by Foreign Minister Subandrio, who has taken a moderate approach on the West Irian issue, most of its members are determined nationalists or leftists who are likely to press for an extremist line. President Sukarno, who during the years immediately following independence almost singlehandedly created the issue of West Irian, would probably encourage an extremist line himself.

The establishment of the committee probably foreshadows a decrease in influence or even dissolution of the army-dominated National Front for the Liberation of West Irian. The army has successfully used this organization for more than a year, not only to prevent the Communists from exploiting the issue of West Irian but also to obstruct their activity in several unrelated fields including labor, agriculture, and youth.

The committee and its composition appear to be another attempt by President Sukarno to conciliate the Communists and to restore a balance in the government between the army and leftist elements. Sukarno's address to the Communists' sixth national congress on 16 September was laudatory and indicated that he planned to check the recent trend toward the political isolation of the Communist party.

The appointment of Suryadarma, the leftist-inclined chief of staff of the air force, as vice chairman of the West Irian Committee probably will further strain relations between the army and the air force.

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[redacted] Suryadarma, who resents the army's political power, has refused to cooperate fully with General Nasution, who is defense minister and army chief of staff. Suryadarma may try to use the committee to increase the air force's influence with Sukarno at the expense of the army.



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